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Abstract
This paper aims to provide two abductive considerations adducing in
favor of the thesis of Necessitism in modal ontology. I demonstrate how
instances of the Barcan formula can be witnessed, when the modal opera-
tors are interpreted ’naturally’ – i.e., as including geometric and nomolog-
ical possibilities – and the quantifiers in the formula range over a domain
of natural, or concrete, entities and their contingently non-concrete ana-
logues. I argue that, because there are considerations within physics and
metaphysical inquiry which corroborate modal relationalist claims con-
cerning the possible geometric structures of spacetime, and dispositional
properties are actual possible entities, the condition of being grounded
in the concrete is consistent with the Barcan formula; and thus – in the
nomological setting – merits adoption by the Necessitist.
1 Introduction
This essay aims to provide two abductive considerations adducing in favor of the
thesis of ’Necessitism’ in modal ontology. The Necessitist hypothesis is induced
by the augmentation of an intended model structure with the Barcan formula,
’⋄∃xFx → ∃x⋄Fx’, from which the principle of the ’Necessary Necessity of Be-
ing’ (NNE) can be derived; i.e., ’∀x∃y(x = y)’. The Barcan formula states
that – on an unrestricted interpretation of the domain of quantification – pos-
sibly if there is something which satisfies a condition, then there is something
which possibly satisfies that condition.1 NNE states that necessarily everything
is such that necessarily there is something to which it is identical. The principle
can be paraphrased as stating that it is necessarily the case that all entities have
1For further discussion, see Barcan (1946; 1947).
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necessary being. Arguments for Necessitism – at both first- and higher-order –
have proceeded abductively. E.g., Williamson (2013: 6.1-6.4) targets issues for
haecceity comprehension, if Contingentism – i.e., the negation of Necessitism
– is true at first-order, and thus for objects. With regard to properties and
relations at higher-order, Williamson’s arguments have further targeted closure
conditions, given a modalized interpretation of comprehension principles; e.g.,
the scheme for mathematical induction, and the completeness properties coun-
tenanced via ordering relations on collections, in order to capture their least
upper bound. The arguments are abductive, because Necessitist modal systems
are shown to satisfy conditions on theory choice; e.g., strength, simplicity, and
compatibility with what is known. It is then argued that non-modal versions
of the comprehension principles cannot satisfy the foregoing abductive criteria
on theory choice, both (i) if Contingentism is adopted at all orders, and (ii) if
Contingentisim is adopted solely at the first-order, with an asymmetry in yet
accepting Necessitist comprehension at higher-order.
In this note, I endeavor to provide further abductive support for the Neces-
sitist hypothesis at all orders, by examining the interaction between the Barcan
formula and nomologically possible worlds. The proposal aims to demonstrate
how Necessitism can be vindicated in a naturalistic setting, without relying
on Lewis’s (1986: 1.8) conception of possible worlds as concrete, spatiotempo-
ral systems.2 I provide two abductive considerations adducing in favor of the
plausibility of the Necessitist hypothesis, by demonstrating how instances of
the Barcan formula can be witnessed when the modal operators are interpreted
2Williamson (2016) argues in favor of a fixed-domain semantics, and thus for first-order
Necessitism applied to possible values of variables and higher-order Necessitism applied to
propositions, in the setting of a possible worlds interpretation of the state spaces countenanced
in dynamical systems theory. The present approach differs from Williamson’s by examining
possible physical geometric structures rather than dynamical systems, as well as the Necessitist
thesis as it applies at higher-order to relations, rather than to propositions.
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’naturally’ – i.e., as including geometric and nomological possibilities – and the
quantifiers in the formula range over a domain of natural, or concrete, entities
and their contingently non-concrete analogues. The natural entities that I tar-
get are, at first-order, the metric structures of spacetime; and, at higher-order,
dispositional properties.3 The foregoing concrete entities are assigned a unique
non-concrete object via a partial function.
The first abductive argument for Nomic Necessitism is that, assuming a
form of dispositional essentialism, the modal profile of dispositional properties
at higher-order requires the adoption of Necessitism at first-order.4 In order to
be tracked by their essential properties, objects at first-order must have neces-
sary being. The second abductive argument for Nomic Necessitism is that the
epistemology of necessary beings has a naturalistically adequate basis.
In Section 2.1, I examine first-order Nomic Necessitism. In Section 2.2, I
examine higher-order Nomic Necessitism, and provide the first of the foregoing
abductive arguments. In Section 3, I outline the second of the foregoing abduc-
tive arguments, by developing a phenomenal version of haecceity comprehen-
sion. I endeavor thereby to provide a naturalistic account of the epistemology
of contingently non-concrete, necessary beings. Section 4 provides concluding
remarks.
Beyond providing further abductive considerations adducing in favor of the
Necessitist hypothesis, the significance of the present contribution can be wit-
nessed by undermining a distinction that has been drawn between (i) Contin-
gentists who reject NNE and claim that necessarily everything is ’grounded in
3See Brighouse (1999) and Belot (2011), for a defense of modal relationalist approaches
to geometric modality. See Bird (2007: 111-114), for a defense of the Barcan formula, when
instances of the formula include dispositional properties.
4The argument parallels Williamson’s (op. cit.: 269-271) argument that there must be
first-order necessary beings, because the haecceities thereof would not be able to track them
in their absence.
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the concrete’ (CONc) – such that, if not grounded in the concrete, it is not
the case that possible non-concrete entities are something, i.e. not everything
has necessary being; and (ii) Necessitists who eschew of any such restriction.5
Because there are considerations within physics and metaphysical inquiry which
corroborate modal relationalist claims concerning the possible geometric struc-
tures of spacetime, and dispositional properties are actual possible entities, the
condition of being grounded in the concrete is consistent with NNE; and thus –
in the nomological setting – merits adoption by the Necessitist.6
2 Individuals and their Dispositions
2.1 First-order Necessitism: Geometric Modality
In this subsection, I define and discuss the axioms comprising the modal system
for natural possibilities. The modal system for natural necessity is here assumed
to be normal, satisfying axiom K and the rule of necessitation. Necessitation
states that ’⊢φ → ⊢φ’. On its naturalist interpretation, the modal operator
satisfies K, i.e. ’(φ→ψ) → (φ→ψ)’, given a general conception of the
dynamics of a physical system which takes the latter to have modal properties,
rather than having the non-modal form of, e.g., structural equation models for
5See Williamson (op. cit.: 314-315), for an argument that difference in the domains of the
quantifiers is such that, beyond modalized universal generalizations that are neutral formulas
in Necessitist and Contingentist systems, there are formulas accepted by proponents of NNE
which are inconsistent with frameworks augmented by CONc.
6Dispositional properties can further be generalized, in order to account for laws of nature;
cf. Bird (op. cit.). Williamson (op. cit.: 326-329) refers to the property of being grounded
in the concrete, λC.C(v), as ’being chunky’. The position of ’chunky-style necessitism’ is
mentioned, and taken to be comprised of NNE; the postulate (23): ’∀x⋄Cx’; and the postulate
(26): ’∀x1 . . . xn[(Fx1 . . . Fxn) → (Cx1 . . . Cxn)]’. On the revised approach to ’chunky-
style’ Necessitism examined here, the proposal eschews of Williamson’s postulate 26, such
that – given the restriction to nomological frames and spaces – properties can be instantiated
by contingently non-concrete objects.
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causation.7 A natural interpretation of the modal operator satisfies axiom T,
i.e. ’φ → φ’, which records the factivity of the modal profile of material
configurations and dispositional properties. Thus, e.g., the rigidification of a
Langrangian function – calculated by the difference of the total kinetic energy
of a system and the total potential energy of the system – will be factive; and
similarly with the Hamiltonian function, calculated as the sum of the values of
the foregoing variables.8
Care must be taken with regard to the assessment of the remaining axioms.
Sider (2009) argues, e.g., that augmenting principles of recombination to the
Barcan formula entails that there are uncountably many non-sets. However,
this is inconsistent with there being a universal set of urelemente (i.e., non-sets),
which – on the iterative conception of sets – would be formed at the first stage.9
Examining Bernays’ (1942) generalization of Cantor’s theorem to classes, i.e.,
non-sets, Uzquiano (2015: 16-17) argues for a restriction on the cardinality of
propositions as possible worlds, by arguing that propositions ought to fall under
zero-place predicate variables, rather than objectual variables. Turner (2016:
239-244) responds to the cardinality issue for Necessitism, by distinguishing
between the entities countenanced in a language of linear geometry which he
takes to be fundamental and thus to reflect ’metaphysically sober reality’, and a
non-fundamental, or ’apparent’, language of ’object-quality representations’ (op.
cit.: 24-25). He argues then that the two notions can be availed of, in order to
place a restriction on recombination, because, for cardinals κ and λ: κ< λ, while
7Models for structural equations have been developed by, inter alia, Galles and Pearl (1998);
Pearl (2000); Woodward and Hitchcock (2003); and Briggs (2012).
8For a counterfactual analysis of the modal profile of physical dynamical laws, see Butter-
field (2004).
9Nolan (1996: 246-247) provides a similar argument against the idea that the totality of
possible worlds form a set, by an application of Cantor’s (1891/1996) theorem to the effect
that the cardinality of a set is less than the cardinality of its powerset; and he argues in favor,
then, of the thought that possible worlds are proper classes, i.e. classes, or non-sets, which do
not themselves form a class or set (op. cit.).
5
κ is real and λ is apparent. Rather than place a restriction on the cardinality
of possible worlds by arguing with Uzquiano that they are not objects, or with
Turner, by arguing that their cardinality is apparent, the retention of both the
principle of recombination and the existence of a fixed domain with a fixed
cardinality can be argued for. Following Cantor (1883/1996: §5:¶3, Endnote
1), one can argue that the height of the cumulative hierarchy of sets has an
Absolute cardinality, despite set-forming operations, such as Power-set, and
Cantor’s theorem. In the modal model-theoretic setting which validates the
Barcan formula at first-order, both (i) a background logic of S5, which partitions
the domain into equivalence classes, where each possible world is accessible to
the others, and (ii) the fixed height of the hierarchy of a first-order domain
of possible objects, is similarly consistent with the augmentation of the model
with Bernays’ theorem, and with Hodes’ (1984) Vlach-operators, which permit
of multiple-indexing in order to account for the relatively expanding domains of
the model. Thus, the relatively expanding domains of a first-order modal model
theory governed by S5 is consistent with the cardinality of the domain being
Absolute.
On the naturalist interpretation of the operator, an argument for the validity
of axiom B can proceed by witnessing that if it is possible that there is a par-
ticular material configuration in a dimension of spacetime, then it is necessarily
possible that the configuration obtains; formally, ’⋄φ → ⋄φ’. However, axiom
4 and axiom E would appear to require further argument, which might not be
witnessed by considerations adducing from physical inquiry alone. 4 states that
’φ → φ’, and E states that ’¬φ → ¬φ’. The principle of the Neces-
sary Necessity of Being – which states that necessarily everything is such that
necessarily there is something to which it is identical – requires axiom 4. When
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conjoined to the system KTB, the system of nomological modality becomes
S5. Thus, if there are contingently non-concrete entities actually corresponding
to natural entities, the necessity of being is itself necessary, vindicating axiom
4. We augment the system of natural modality with the Barcan formula and
its converse, ’⋄∃xFx → ∃x⋄Fx’ and ’∃x⋄Fx → ⋄∃xFx’. For the purposes of
this note, we adopt Barcan S5 as a working hypothesis; the aim of the essay
is to examine whether it is consistent with present physical and metaphysical
inquiry.10
Concrete objects are material configurations of spacetime. Rather than being
identical to the point-particles which are configured in 3-dimensional spacetime,
concrete objects are thus regions of configuration spacetime themselves, span-
ning lower (3-) and higher (3n)-dimensions.11 Suppose that there is a region of
spacetime with metric affine structure of dimension n, and a generalized inner
product with signature, (+,-), s.t. 〈1, n -1〉 n≥2.12 The structure is affine, given
the line that can be drawn between a pair of material points, within both 3-
and 3n-dimensional spacetime. The affine structure is metric, given the distance
relations that can be defined on the directed lines, i.e. vectors. The distance
measure satisfies the following conditions: ’d(x,y) = 0 iff x = y’; symmetry –
’d(x,y) = d(y,x)’; and triangle inequality – ’d(x,z) ≤ d(x,y) + d(y,z)’.13 A gen-
eralized inner product on a vector space, V, on which metric structure is built,
10I prescind here from targeting topological theories, which have been axiomatized by in-
tuitionistic models and are taken to satisfy S4. For S4 systems of topological semantics for
modal logic, see McKinsey and Tarski (1944); Goldblatt (1993); Awodey and Kishida (2007);
and Lando (2010). Kremer (2009) provides an S5 system for topological semantics.
11See Skow (2005); Schaffer (2009); and Dorr (ms), for the proposal that material objects
just are regions of configuration space, which span 3- and 3n-dimensions. The present discus-
sion is agnostic about which of the dimensions is fundamental. For a view on which the entity
represented by the wavefunction in 3n-dimensional space is fundamental, by contrast to the
entities residing in lower, 3-dimensional space, see North (2013). For a view on which physical
ontology ought, instead, to target density operators on systems of states of spacetime, see
Wallace and Timpson (2010).
12The source of affine structure is discussed in Maudlin (2010).
13For further details, see Belot, op. cit.: 12; and Malament, op. cit.: 2.4.
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satisfies the following four conditions:
The product is a binary mapping from V to the set of reals, R, s.t.
(i) ∀a,b∈V 〈a,b〉 = 〈b,a〉;
(ii)∀a,b,c∈V 〈a, b+c〉 = 〈a,b〉 + 〈a,c〉;
(iii) For all reals, r, in R and ∀a,b∈V, 〈a, rb〉 = r〈a, b〉; and
(iv) ∀a 6=0∈V,∃b∈V, s.t. 〈a,b〉6=0.14
When the inner product of the vector space on which the distance measures
are defined has signature, (+,-), s.t. (n, 0) with n≥2, then the metric affine
space is Euclidean. When the inner product of the vector space on which the
distance measures are defined has signature, (+,-), s.t. (1, n - 1) with n≥2,
then the metric affine space is Minkowskian.
Material configurations of spacetime ground – idiomatically: explain ’in
virtue of what’ – a possible metric affine space comprises the concrete spatial-
temporal geometry of a world.15 The condition of groundedness permits the
modal relationalist to match the ontology of substantivalist approaches, ac-
cording to which there is only one actual material and spatial geometry. The
conditions of (i) groundedness and (ii) identification of material objects with
regions of configuration space, ensures therefore that the modal relationalist
proposal does not come at the cost of eschewing of a material ontology. The
modal relationalist proposal is thus consistent with the contention that, as Field
puts it: ’Modality is not a general surrogate for ontology’ (1989: 252).
14For further details, see Malament (ms: 15-18).
15Cf. Belot (op. cit.: 78-79). For the logic of ground, with both an operator-based and a
relation-based semantics, see Fine (2012a; 2012b).
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2.2 Higher-order Necessitism: Dispositions
In this subsection, I target instances of the Necessary Necessity of Being at
higher-order, focusing on dispositional properties. Dispositional properties are
actual possible properties. In order to complete the first abductive argument for
Nomic Necessitism, I argue that the necessary being of dispositional properties
requires the adoption of the Barcan formula at first-order.
In order to induce a correlation between concrete and contingently non-
concrete entities, we introduce a partial function, v, interpreted as a value as-
signment.16 The value assignment maps concrete entities to the contingently
non-concrete entities in the domain. We assume both that the domain is closed,
and that two assignments do not assign two concrete entities to a single non-
concrete entity.
Dispositional properties can take the following form:
Necessarily, a concrete object, x, instantiates a dispositional property, δ, if
and only if φ. φ includes, as a necessary clause, the condition that, were x to
be stimulated [S( )] then δ would be manifested [M( )].
Formally:
[λδ.δ(x) ≡ φ], where
φ only if S(x) → M(δ).
The disposition would become manifest, were its corresponding concrete
object to undergo a stimulus. In the absence of the stimulus, the dispositional
property is an actual, possible property of the concrete object’s contingently
non-concrete analogue. The concrete object’s stimulus induces the concrete
manifestation of the actual possible disposition.
The argument for first-order Necessitism would appear to require a version
16A similar maneuver, with regard to assigning individuals – including concrete and abstract
objects – to their arbitrary counterparts, is pursued in Fine (1985).
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of dispositional essentialism, i.e. the claim that two objects are identical only if
they possess identical dispositional properties.17 Actual dispositional properties
which could be instantiated necessarily track their objects, only because the
dispositions can be defined on non-concrete, possible structures of spacetime,
and the latter are correlated via partial functions to their concrete analogues.
So, dispositional properties cannot track possible objects in the latter’s absence.
In order to be tracked by their essential properties, objects at first-order must
have necessary being.
The foregoing provides an abductive argument for Nomic Necessitism at
first-order. Assuming that objects bear their dispositions essentially, then –
because dispositions are actual, possibilia – the existence of dispositional prop-
erties requires the existence of possible objects to which they can be modally
and essentially correlated.
3 Naturalist Conditions on the Epistemology of
Necessary Beings
In this section, I develop, finally, a phenomenal analysis of haecceitistic prop-
erties.18 Similarly to abstraction principles for abstract objects, the phenom-
enal profile of haecceities provides an epistemically tractable comprehension
scheme; and enables thereby a non-reductive, though naturalistically adequate,
account of the epistemology of contingently non-concrete, necessary beings. A
naturalistically adequate account of the epistemic foundations of contingently
non-concrete necessary beings provides a second abductive argument for general
17Cf. Bird, op. cit.: ch. 5.
18See Khudairi (ms), for further discussion, and for a defense of the claim that phenomenal
consciousness has a metaphysical and modal haecceitistic profile.
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Necessitism.
In perceptual – in particular, visual – psychology, state frames are a set, Ω, of
nomologically possible worlds, and they encode information about the source of
lightwave spectra. Ω is therefore a subset of the frame of nomologically possible
worlds examined in Section 2 above. Ω is closed under complementation and
intersection; a σ-algebra is thus defined thereon.
In the model, <(∪w: w∈Ω), Pr>, a random variable, a, in the [0,1] interval
is a function from subsets of Ω to real numbers. Pr is defined as the probability
density of a. The operations of Pr are further constrained by the following
calculations:
• Normality
Pr(T) = 1
• Non-negativity
Pr(φ) ≥ 0
• Additivity
If φ and ψ are disjoint, then
Pr(φ ∪ ψ) = Pr(φ) + Pr(ψ)
• Conditionalization
Pr(φ | ψ) = Pr(φ ∩ ψ) / Pr(ψ)
The visual system calculates which of the possibilities in Bayesian perceptual
models and spaces is the constancy; i.e. which possibility should be designated
as actual. The constancy figures as the accuracy-condition for the attribution
of properties, such as volume and boundedness, to distal particulars. Once
the perceptual representational state has been derived via the visual system’s
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computation of the constancy, phenomenal properties can be defined thereon.
When phenomenal properties are instantiated on perceptual representational
states, they induce phenomenal consciousness of the state.
• Phenomenal Properties
Comprehension:
Comp = λα∀x.α(x) ⇐⇒ A
with α not free in A
Bottom-up (more generally, exogenous), spatial-based, property-based, and
diffuse and focal mechanisms of attention comprise a necessary condition on the
instantiation of phenomenal properties. The necessity of attention is corrob-
orated by the phenomenon known as the ’attentional blink’. The attentional
blink holds if and only if shifting attentional allocation to one of two stimuli
induces lack of awareness of the distinct stimulus to which attention was pre-
viously distributed.19 The normalized formula for the neurofunctional role of
attentional mechanisms is as follows: E¯i(n) =
Ei(n)
σ2+
∑
i
Ei(n)
– i.e. the timed fire-
rate oscillations of a set of neurons, referred to as a ’vectorwave’ – is divided
by the summed activity of a larger set of peripheral neurons (cf. Reynolds and
Heeger, 2009). Thus, the formula A in phenomenal property comprehension
principles includes ’E¯i(n)’ as at least a necessary clause.
20
19However, deployment of object-based attention might not comprise a necessary condi-
tion. Block (2013) argues that object-based attention might not be a necessary condition,
because the grain of object-based attention is coarser than the grain of conscious object-based
perception in cases of visual-identity crowding.
20Deployment of the kinds of attention might not be sufficient for instantiation of the kinds
of consciousness. Jiang et al (2006)’s results demonstrate the insufficiency of exogenous atten-
tion, in virtue of the phenomenon of interocular suppression. Interocular suppression involves
showing distinct stimuli to each eye of the patient, one of which masks, i.e., prevents conscious-
ness of the other stimulus to which however their attention is still exogenously distributed;
so they attend without the visual representations becoming conscious. Exogenous attention
might yet be sufficient, if the above results were interpreted as targeting a phenomenon distinct
from attention, such as non-attentional microsaccade orienting.
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3.1 Haecceity Comprehension
The target haecceity comprehension principles can be precisified as follows.
• Haecceity Comprehension
∀x,y∃Φ[Φx⇐⇒ (x=y)]
∀x,y[∃Φ[Φx⇐⇒ (x=y)]→∃x(x=y)]
Suppose that:
• λi∃ιx.(in)(x),
where x denotes a member of the domain of subjects, and in denotes the set
of phenomenal properties instantiated by a subject at a context.
Then, haecceities modally-lock onto their subjects if and only if haecceities are
individuated by the phenomenal properties instantiated by the subjects. Thus,
necessarily there is a unique subject for whom necessarily a set of phenomenal
properties is necessarily instantiated:
∀x,y∃Φ[Φx⇐⇒ (x=y)]
iff
Φ(x) = Φ(y) iff λi∃ιx.[in](x).
The properties are metaphysically haecceitistic, because they target the
identity-conditions on individuals rather than on worlds. The metaphysical
haecceities have a hybrid profile, because individuals are uniquely typed by the
phenomenal properties that they instantiate, however quantification over the
individuals is an ineliminable condition on their identity and distinctness. The
second abductive argument for Nomic Necessitism is thus that a naturalistically
adequate epistemic conduit can be specified for knowledge of the contingently
non-concrete.
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4 Concluding Remarks
In this essay, I have endeavored to provide two abductive arguments for Neces-
sitism, on a restriction of the operators to naturalist modalities and a restriction
of the quantifiers to concrete entities and their non-concrete analogues. Against
Nomic Contingentism, actual possible dispositional properties which could be
manifested require the necessary existence of objects at first-order. If material
configurations could be nothing, then dispositional properties could not track
the latter in their absence. Thus, in order to be able to track their objects, the
objects – concrete and non-concrete – must have necessary being. The second
abductive argument against Nomic Contingentism addressed the epistemic foun-
dations of contingently non-concrete, necessary beings, via phenomenal haecce-
ity comprehension. If some individuals are typed by the phenomenal properties
that they instantiate, yet quantification over the individuals is an ineliminable
condition on their identification, then the empirical conditions on phenomenal
property instantiation enable a naturalistically adequate means of explaining
our knowledge of the contingently non-concrete. The arguments advanced in
the foregoing provide preliminary abductive support for the generalization of
the validity of Necessitism to metaphysically possible worlds. However, it is
sufficient for the results here outlined to have demonstrated that – beyond the
satisfaction of scientific criteria on theory choice – Necessitism can be vindicated
in a naturalistic setting.
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